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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 950350-CA 
CLINT DONALD YOUNG, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES QN APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court violate rules 404(b) or 403 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence by allowing a witness to testify about a 
Circle A Outfitter check that defendant forged after he tendered 
the Circle A Outfitter check in this case? 
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's 
determination about the admissibility of evidence under rules 403 
or 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the reviewing court will 
sustain the ruling unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Morrell. 
803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Was defendant adequately represented at trial in accord 
with his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). The claim presents a 
question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying trial. 
See State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION?f STATUTES, AND RULE? 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403, governing exclusion of relevant 
evidence, provides: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: 
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(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person 
in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such a proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery for passing 
a check of $100 or more in an Orem Albertson's on May 1, 1994 
(R.18). After defendant was bound over to district court, his 
counsel filed a motion in limine uto limit any prior criminal 
history or bad acts of the defendant" (R. 33). The court 
postponed ruling on the motion until trial. At that juncture, it 
denied the motion and allowed the testimony (R. 357). Defendant 
was convicted as charged. The court sentenced defendant to one 
to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and levied fines and 
restitution (160-62) . This timely appeal followed (R. 172) . 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On a slow Sunday evening in early May, 1994, defendant 
presented a three-party, computer-generated payroll check, made 
out to Clint D. Young for $396.69, to an Albertson's checker in 
Orem (R. 266, 268, 270, 289, addendum A). Suspicious of the 
check's authenticity, the checker took a good look at defendant 
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and asked him for his driver's license (R. 272-73). He then 
compared the picture on the license, which belonged to Clint D. 
Young, with the individual standing in front of him. Except for 
partial changes &n facial hair, the individual matched the 
picture (R. 275). The checker also compared the number on the 
driver's license with the number appearing on the check. They, 
too, matched (R. 276). The checker asked defendant to write his 
telephone number on the back of the check and endorse it, and 
defendant complied (R. 276). 
The checker testified at trial: 
[A]ny time we see a dot matrix printer and 
the double signature line like this, that 90 
percent of the time they're a bad check. So 
I wasn't going to take it until I saw the 
initials right up here, which stands for one 
of our managers in our store. So we're 
taught if a manager approves it, we take it. 
So I took it. 
(R. 268). 
In order to cash the check, the checker needed more money 
and so called the manager on duty, a different manager than the 
one who had apparently initialed the check earlier. The manager 
brought the money down and took a good look at the person 
tendering the check (R. 293). 
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Several days later, the check was returned to the store's 
bookkeeper (R. 294). Subsequent investigation and trial 
testimony revealed that the check had been written on a Circle A 
Outfitter accounb which was closed in 1989; that John Norris, one 
of two signatories on the account and one of the names that 
appeared on the bad check, had died in a car accident in 1993; 
and that the telephone number defendant wrote on the back of the 
check at the request of the checker was not the telephone number 
of Clint Young nor did anyone at that number know of a Clint 
Young (R. 300-04, 310, 318-19). 
An Orem police detective investigated the case (R. 308). He 
showed an enlarged photo of Clint Young, taken from his driver's 
license, to the Albertson's checker, who recognized Young as the 
person who had presented the check (R. 312). 
Nineteen days after the Albertson's incident, defendant 
tendered a check for $150, also written on the Circle A Outfitter 
account, at another grocery store in West Valley City (R. 388, 
390, 392) . Because Holly Hales, manager of the store, had known 
defendant since childhood, she okayed the check without ever 
looking at the signature, which bore the name not of defendant 
but of "Doug Renterio" (R. 389, 391, addendum B). This check was 
also returned as a forgery. 
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Some months later, at the Orem police station, the 
investigating detective asked defendant to produce a writing 
sample (R. 314-15) . Defendant began the task but did not 
complete it, annpuncing that he had written enough (R. 317). 
Because defendant refused to complete the requested writing 
sample and because the limited sample that defendant did produce 
was printed, rather than in the requested cursive writing, only 
the signatures on defendant's driver's license and on the forged 
check could be analyzed and compared (R. 333, 380). A 
handwriting expert testified "that it was highly probable that 
both of these handwritings were created by the same individual" 
(R. 363). All that prevented the expert from making a "positive" 
identification was the paucity of cursive writing available for 
analysis (R. 364). 
Defendant denied any involvement in the Albertson's check 
forgery. He claimed that he had never been in the Orem 
Albertson's, and that he "did not cash the one at Albertson's at 
all" (R. 398). He also asserted that he had lost his driver's 
license a year before and so could not have presented it as 
identification in order to cash the check at issue here (R. 4 02). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it failed to balance the probativeness of Holly 
Hales's testimony' against its potential for unfair prejudice, as 
required by Utah Rule of Evidence 403. While defendant raised 
the issue in a pre-trial motion, he stood silent as the court 
admitted the testimony under rule 404(b) without analyzing it 
under rule 403. Because counsel did not alert the court as to 
its omission, he is precluded from raising the issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
Any recourse to plain error as a way around the waiver 
doctrine fails because the testimony of Holly Hales did not 
unfairly prejudice defendant. First, if the trial court had 
complied with rule 4 03, the testimony would have been admitted. 
And, second, even if the testimony was admitted in error, the 
error was harmless because there was no reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the testimony, the result of the trial would have 
been different. 
Defendant also argues that he received constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel. He cites three instances of 
deficient performance: first, his counsel's failure to object to 
the trial court's omission of the 403 balancing test; second; his 
7 
counsel's failure to object to the scope of Holly Hales's 
testimony; and, third, his counsel's failure to request a 
limiting jury instruction concerning how Holly Hales's testimony 
could be used, intimately, defendant's ineffective assistance 
claim fails because he has not demonstrated any prejudice 
resulting from his counsel's alleged shortcomings. Just as any 
error in the trial court's failure to make an evidentiary ruling 
proved to be harmless, so any deficient performance on the part 
of defendant's trial counsel failed to create a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome for him. 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT QNE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
ALLOWING HOLLY HALES TO TESTIFY; 
AND, IN ANY EVENT, HER TESTIMONY 
DID NOT PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF 
THE CASE 
Defendant does not argue that the challenged testimony was 
inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Rather, 
he claims that the trial court erred by failing to conduct the 
balancing test required by rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
prior to allowing Holly Hales to testify about receiving a bad 
check from defendant on the Circle A Outfitter account at another 
grocery store. Consistent with the rationale for the court's 
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404(b) ruling, argues defendant, the testimony should have been 
limited to "opportunity" or "identity" -- that is, "to testimony 
that Hales saw [defendant] in possession of a check from the same 
account as that jased in the forgery committed at Albertson's" 
(Br. of App. at 12). 
Defendant originally raised the rule 404(b) and 403 issues 
in a motion in limine, in which he requested "to limit any prior 
criminal history or bad acts of the defendant" (R. 33). Terming 
the motion "a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be 
adduced at time of trial," the court "refrain[ed] from a general 
ruling," opting to "consider at the time of trial the objections 
of counsel for defendant" (R. 56 or addendum C). The court also 
ordered counsel for the State not to "inquire into other crimes, 
wrongs or bad acts of the defendant without first acquiring the 
court's permission to do so." Id. Subsequently, defense counsel 
withdrew from the case, and new counsel was appointed (R. 63, 
64) . 
At trial, counsel for the State, as directed, asked 
permission before calling Holly Hales as a witness (R. 345). 
Counsel explained that because the identity of defendant as the 
person who passed the check had been put at issue in opening 
argument, Hales's testimony, going to both defendant's identity 
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and his access to the Circle A Outfitter checks, qualified for 
admission under rule 404(b) (R. 345, 346-47). Defendant 
responded that the incidents were too factually dissimilar to 
warrant admissibility (R. 352). The court then ruled: 
That he certainly has had an opportunity to 
have these checks. And I think for that 
purpose I will allow her to testify. And 
then the jury can give it whatever weight it 
wants. And argue whatever you want, but the 
opportunity is there if he had those checks 
in his hand, at least that one check in his 
hand, and that can be definitely identified 
as being his. So there's an opportunity to 
get to these checks of which an account had 
already been closed. 
(R. 357). Following the court's 404(b) ruling, the trial 
continued and, later, Holly Hales testified. Defense counsel, 
whose predecessor had initially filed the motion in limine 
requesting that evidence be limited pursuant to rules 404(b), 
403, and 609, stood silently by. He did not renew the 403 
objection or otherwise alert the court that it had neglected to 
balance the probativeness of the evidence against its potential 
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for unfair prejudice.1 Instead, counsel simply watched the court 
commit what he now claims was prejudicial error. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires wxa clear and definite 
objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal." 
State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert• fleiUgd, 493 
U.S. 814 (1989). Failing to make such an objection denies the 
trial court the opportunity to correct the alleged error in a 
timely fashion. Under such circumstances, the objection is 
normally waived. See, e.g., State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785 
(Utah 1992). 
Absent any assertion by defendant that exceptional 
circumstances exist, appellate review will, therefore, be 
available only if defendant can demonstrate that the trial court 
committed "plain error." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah 
1
 Once the evidence had been ruled admissible under rule 
404(b), defendant could only benefit from drawing the court's 
attention to its omission and consequently regaining one further 
opportunity to exclude the evidence. If a trial court fails to 
engage in a 403 analysis, defendant should logically bear the 
burden of raising the issue because defendant is the only party 
who stands to benefit from the ruling. See Nelson v. State. 864 
S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993)(holding that defendant failed 
to preserve his 403 objection by not objecting on 403 grounds 
after the court had overruled his 404(b) objection); State v. 
Cannon, 713 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1985)(holding that the trial court is 
not required sua sponte to rule on whether the admission of 
defendant's statement would result in unfair prejudice). 
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1989). To do so, defendant must establish three elements: first, 
that an error occurred; second, that the error was obvious; and 
third, that the error was harmful. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993); £££ State v. Verde. 770 P.2d at 122. If any 
one of these elements is missing, plain error cannot be found. 
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209. 
Even if defendant's claim is interpreted as an assertion of 
plain error, which he did not argue, it would fail. First, while 
defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the court's 
omission of the 4 03 analysis, the error was not harmful because 
the weighing of probativeness against unfair prejudice would have 
rendered Holly Hales's testimony admissible. That is, any error 
committed in failing to apply rule 403 or in failing to object to 
the omission was obviated by the correctness of the trial court's 
ultimate ruling in admitting the testimony. 
Under rule 403, evidence "may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. . . . " Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Whether 
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice is a "fact-intensive question." State v. 
Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990). "Standing alone, 
the fact that the evidence may be prejudicial to defendant does 
12 
not necessarily render the evidence incompetent. . . If evidence 
is prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical 
fact, it is properly admissible." State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 
571 (Utah App. 1691). 
A trial court may consider a variety of factors in balancing 
the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for 
unfair prejudice. These factors include u'the strength of the 
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has 
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the 
efficacy of alternative proof and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility."' State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 
1988)(quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence. § 190. at 565 (3d 
ed. 1984)). 
Under this standard, the testimony of Holly Hales was 
admissible because it showed that defendant cashed a check on the 
same closed account at another grocery store just eighteen days 
after this incident. Because Hales was a competent eyewitness, 
well-acquainted with defendant, she provided strdng evidence of 
defendant's guilt in uttering the second check. ££. Morrell. 803 
P.2d at 296 (strong evidence of defendant's guilt in view of 
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competent eyewitness testimony). The reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from Hales's testimony were that defendant had access to 
the Circle A Outfitter checks and that he had been accurately 
identified by the two Albertson's employees. Hales's testimony 
was thus highly probative to show both that defendant had access 
to the checks and that he was the individual who also cashed the 
check at Albertson's. The trial court, therefore, correctly 
admitted the evidence, even though it omitted an analytical step 
in so doing. 
Furthermore, Hales's testimony would also have been 
admissible under rule 403 because defense counsel put the matter 
of defendant's identity as the individual who passed the check at 
Albertson's directly at issue. He told the jury during opening 
argument: 
Our defense is that it was not Mr. Young that 
did this. Mr. Young lost his driver's 
license well over a year ago. So somebody 
had his driver's license, and somebody had 
some blank checks, and somebody made a check 
out to Clint Young, and somebody used his 
driver's license. There must have been some 
similarity in the look -- I don't know how it 
got by the cashier — but it wasn't Mr. Young 
who did it. 
(R. 256-57). With this theory of the case before the jury, the 
State had to adduce evidence showing that defendant was the 
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person who passed the Circle A Outfitter check at Albertson's. 
Holly Hales's testimony, which showed defendant had access to the 
Circle A Outfitter checks and which corroborated the 
identification o£ defendant previously made by the Albertson's 
checker and the manager on duty, was thus highly probative as 
rebuttal to defendant's theory of the case. Finally, Hales's 
testimony was not the sort of inflammatory evidence that would be 
likely to "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'' Shickles. 
760 P.2d at 296. 
Second, if defendant's claim is interpreted as an assertion 
of plain error, it also fails because, even assuming arguendo 
that the trial court should not have admitted the evidence, any 
error in its admission was harmless. Harmless errors "are 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). In order to 
warrant reversal, the likelihood of a different result "must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." State 
v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). 
To determine whether an error is harmful, a reviewing court 
considers "a host of factors including, among others, the 
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importance of the witness's testimony to the prosecution's case 
and the overall strength of the State's case." State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1991)(citing State v. Hackford. 
737 P.2d 200, 20B (Utah 1987)). 
In this case, totally apart from Holly Hales's testimony, 
the State's case against defendant was strong. Two eyewitnesses 
unequivocally identified defendant as the individual who tendered 
the check (R. 277, 293-94). A police detective testified that he 
asked defendant to produce a handwriting sample, but that 
defendant only partially complied (R. 314, 317). A reasonable 
inference from defendant's refusal is that he believed a complete 
cursive writing sample would show him to be the signatory of the 
forged check. ££^ Estate of Schoch v. Kail. 311 N.W.2d 903, 907 
(Neb. 1981)(unexplained failure of party to call available 
witness with peculiar knowledge may permit inference that 
testimony would not support party); Belanger v. Cross. 488 A.2d 
410, 412-13 (R.I. 1985)(litigant's unexplained failure to produce 
available witness who would be expected to give material, 
favorable testimony permits inference that testimony would have 
been adverse). 
A handwriting expert who compared defendant's signature on 
his driver's license with the signature on the forged check 
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concluded that there was a "high probability" that the two were 
written by the same person (R. 363, 366). All that prevented him 
from categorizing the identification as "positive" -- the highest 
level of certainty — was the fact that he had only two 
signatures to compare. He explained: 
Well, the documents that Detective Nielsen 
had provided to me on November 7th were --
the problem that we had in that particular 
handwriting comparison is that he had brought 
me over examples that had been printed. And 
unfortunately in handwriting examination, we 
can't compare oranges with apples. We have 
to compare apples with apples and oranges 
with oranges. Such as printed material with 
printed material, or hand long written 
material with hand long written material. 
(R. 333-34). He also testified that, since he had already 
identified many "points of identification" that the two 
signatures shared, more handwriting samples would normally only 
serve to increase his level of certainty. In his experience, he 
had never made a "highly probable" identification and then become 
less certain when presented with more handwriting exemplars (R. 
370-72). 
The eyewitness and expert testimony thus strongly pointed to 
defendant as the guilty party in this case. Thu^, even without 
Holly Hales's testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence on 
which to convict defendant. Any error in the admission of Holly 
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Hales's testimony, therefore, was harmless because "there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." Verde/ 770 P. 2d at 120; accord State v. Olsen. 
869 P.2d 1004, 1009-11 (Utah App. 1994). 
POINT TWO 
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE 
BECAUSE ANY ERROR HE MAY HAVE 
COMMITTED DID NOT SO UNDERMINE 
CONFIDENCE IN THE JURY'S VERDICT AS 
TO CREATE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY 
OF A DIFFERENT VERDICT 
In order to establish constitutionally ineffective 
assistance of counsel, defendant must show both that his 
counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the 
deficient performance, a reasonable probability existed that the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Stfrte V, TempUn, 805 P.2d 
182, 186-87 (Utah 1990). 
In this case, defendant alleges three instances of deficient 
performance, all related to the testimony of Holly Hales: first, 
that his counsel should have objected to the trial court's 
failure to balance the probativeness of Hales's testimony against 
its potential for unfair prejudice, as required by rule 403, Utah 
18 
Rules of Evidence; second, that he should have objected to the 
scope of the testimony Holly Hales offered; and, third, that he 
should have requested a limiting jury instruction, to make clear 
to the jury how Hales's testimony could be used (Br. of App. at 
17) . 
To demonstrate deficient performance, the first prong of 
ineffectiveness, defendant must show that his counsel "made 
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. To meet this standard, trial counsel's 
representation must fall "below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Id. at 688. Appellate courts consider the many 
circumstances and decisions facing trial counsel and "indulge in 
the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. 
First, defendant asserts that his counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient because he failed to bring the 4 03 
balancing test to the court's attention. To point out that 
defense counsel missed an evidentiary objection, however, falls 
well short of establishing deficient performance. See Codianna 
v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1113 (Utah 1983). Indeed, unlike rule 
609, which specifically mandates application of rule 403, rule 
19 
404(b) makes no mention of a balancing test. The error of 
omission was not plain to the trial court or to defense counsel. 
Under similar circumstances, this Court recently observed "that 
the failure of counsel to object to an alleged error that is not 
readily apparent cannot constitute an objectively deficient 
performance." State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 592 (Utah App. 
1995) . 
Second, defendant cites three statements that he believes 
his counsel should have objected to during Hales's testimony. He 
argues that his counsel should have objected to Hales's testimony 
that defendant "committed forgery against her and GGG Foods using 
a check from the same account as had been used in the Albertson's 
forgery" (Br. of App. at 12). Plainly, however, this testimony 
fell squarely within rule 404(b) and was highly probative of 
defendant's access to the Circle A checks, his identity as a 
person who had uttered such a check, and his knowledge and intent 
with regard to use of the checks. The evidence was highly 
probative of the central issue in the case, which was defendant's 
identity as the individual who presented the check at 
Albertson's. Nothing in this testimony warranted an objection 
from defense counsel. 
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Defendant also argues that counsel should have objected when 
"Hales was allowed to testify that Young had even called her 
after the incident to apologize" (Br. of App. at 13). This 
testimony, however, corroborated Hales's identification of 
defendant as the person who passed the bad check in West Valley 
and so was highly probative to show that Hales had correctly 
identified him. 
Finally, defendant believes his counsel should have objected 
when Hales testified that she was fired from her job as a result 
of taking the check from defendant (Br. of App. at 12). The 
State agrees that this statement was objectionable because it was 
not probative of any issue before the jury. However, "counsel 
need not recognize and raise every possible objection in order to 
meet the competence standard." Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1113. The 
Sixth Amendment requires a competent attorney; it does not 
require perfection. Id. 
Third, defendant asserts that his counsel was deficient for 
failing to request a jury instruction that would limit the use to 
which Holly Hales's testimony could be put. The law is well-
settled that a reviewing court presumes that counsel has rendered 
adequate assistance. Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 690. "[W]hen 
counsel has failed to take a particular action, a [reviewing 
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court] must determine whether such failure was justified by 
tactical or other considerations." State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 
1062, 1066 (Utah 1988). If defense counsel's failure to request 
the instruction Can be considered sound trial strategy, a 
reviewing court will not find deficient performance. Dunn, 850 
P.2d at 1225. In this case, defense counsel might well have 
determined that it would be strategically more advantageous not 
to underscore Hales's testimony with a special instruction. 
gtate vr Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990)(citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) Such a decision should not be 
second-guessed by this Court. 
Ultimately, even apart from the weakness of his allegations 
of deficient performance, defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim fails because he has not demonstrated any prejudice 
resulting from the admission or scope of Hales's testimony or the 
omission of a limiting instruction. Rather, he merely asserts, 
without pointing to any factual support in the record, that u[i]n 
this particular case, the adversarial process cannot be relied 
upon as having produced a just result" and that, if counsel had 
understood the rules of evidence and the law interpreting them, 
the results of the trial would likely have been more favorable. 
Br. of App. at 19. 
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When an appellate court considers the prejudice prong of an 
ineffectiveness claim it "should consider the totality of the 
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors 
affect the entirfe evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect 
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Tempiin. 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 696). 
In this case, two eyewitnesses and one handwriting expert 
offered testimony that pointed strongly to defendant's 
culpability. Holly Hales7s testimony, while it bolstered this 
testimony, was by no means the linchpin of the case. Indeed, in 
order to acquit defendant, the jury had to believe defendant and 
his father, and disbelieve not only Holly Hales, but the two 
Albertson's employees, the handwriting expert, a police 
detective, and a bank security officer. Thus, Holly Hales's 
testimony, while useful for the State, did not affect "the entire 
evidentiary picture." Cf. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 (testimony 
affecting the credibility of the only witness who gave direct 
evidence of defendant's guilt affects "the entire evidentiary 
picture"). 
The prejudice prong of defendant's ineffectiveness claim 
thus fails on the same grounds as his prior claim. Just as any 
error in the trial court's failure to make an evidentiary ruling 
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proved to be harmless, so any deficient performance on the part 
of defendant's trial counsel failed to create a reasonable 
probability of a different outcome for him. Failing to prove the 
prejudice prong,; defendant's ineffectiveness claim must also 
fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
The State requests oral argument and a written opinion in 
this case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J_ day of April, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
w ^ C. ^MluM^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Circle A Outfitter check, made out to defendant, 
cashed at Albertson's 
Pay to the (order of_ 
CIRCLE A^OUTFITTER 4-88 ^ * 
2m^°\ 
#24 7TH"AVE. 565-9249 
MIDVALg 
1190 
• n ^ K , ^ 
1243 
*&0 
L
_? «• " " ' J » 
Si rrv7v-S"r* .Dollars 
FOL. PflVROl. 1 
•00 L ilOn" i:,' V icf ^ M l l l b Oil" /0000 0 3 t lE i& t V 
Rocky Mountain Bank Not* MB Mountain Spltndor 
ADDENDUM B 
Circle A Outfitter check cashed by defendant 
in West Valley City 
ID 
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ADDENDUM C 
T r i a l C o u r t ' s Memorandum Decis ion 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIC 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, Stat* of Utah 
fdjlUKT # - ° W 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
CUNT D. YOUNG 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 941400580 
DATE: January 3, 1995 
JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK 
CLERK: NAH 
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of 
of Evidence. The Court has read the memorandum in support of and in opposition to said 
motion and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions. 
1. Defendant's motion is a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be 
produced at time of trial. 
2. Rules 403, 404 and 609 are fact sensitive, with certain discretion in the trial 
court. 
3. This court is without sufficient information to make a ruling at the present time. 
4. The court will refrain from a general ruling at this time and consider at the time 
of trial the objections of counsel for the defendant. 
5. Plaintiff's counsel should not inquire into other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of 
the defendant at the time of trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so. 
6. The Court can more appropriately make its decision regarding what evidence 
should be allowed at the time of trial. 
7. Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered at the time of trial, outside of 
the presence and hearing of the jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into 
areas covered by rules 403, 404, and 609. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 3rd day of Janua 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
